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Abstract 
Recent studies have hypothesised that the international crime drop was the result of the rise in cybercrime. We 
subject this ‘cybercrime hypothesis’ to critical assessment. We find significant evidence and argument indicating that 
cybercrime could not have caused the crime drop, and so we reject the cybercrime hypothesis.
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Introduction
Recent studies hypothesise that the long-term decline in 
crimes including burglary, car theft and assault, known as 
the international crime drop (van Dijk et al. 2012) were 
the result of increased cybercrime. We term this the 
‘cybercrime hypothesis’. Four examples demonstrate:
First, Tcherni et al. (2016) conjecture that
“A pronounced drop in crime, since the early 1990s, 
has encompassed every crime category … However, 
over the same period, the rates of online property 
crime (OPC) have been on the rise according to 
available evidence.”
This study questions the existence of a property crime 
drop and suggest in relation to the violent crime drop 
that
“some direct-contact predatory crimes may turn vio-
lent precisely because of the proximity of the offender 
and victim in time and space. This is not so true for 
cyber-predatory crimes since the two never meet 
in person. So, one indirect consequence of property 
crimes occurring online could be a drop in the vio-
lent crime rate.” (p. 907)
Second, Caneppele and Aebi (2017) report that
“the authors consider that the rise of online and 
hybrid crimes have contributed to the drop of offline 
crimes. This is a consequence of the development of 
the Internet …”. (p. 1)
progressing to
“The crime drop is an illusion then? The data pre-
sented in this paper suggest that a proper answer is 
‘partially’.” (p. 10)
Third, Button and Cross (2017) testify that
“[Crime] over the last 20 years has been falling and 
this has stimulated much debate over whether this 
is really happening… crime has shifted to new forms 
…[and] it is difficult to determine the true size of 
the [cyber-crime] problem and to what extent tradi-
tional criminals have moved to cyber frauds…”
Fourth, Levi notes of economic cyber-crime that
“it is not obvious whether this is just displacement 
for the fall in household and automobile property 
crime, nor how much overlap there is between the 
offenders and past ‘offline’ offenders.” (Levi 2017; 3).
There is some variation across authors in their empha-
sis, but their work informs the specification of a signifi-
cant research question: Did cybercrime cause the crime 
drop? The remainder of this article examines the argu-
ment and evidence.
Argument and evidence
Lack of supporting evidence
Our initial observation is that the studies cited above 
fail to provide robust supporting evidence. They mostly 
assert that cybercrime rose concurrent with physical 
crime’s decline and suggest a causal connection. They 
justify a lack of analytic precision on the grounds that 
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there is no firm evidence about cybercrime trends. How-
ever we suggest this misses the point because there is 
considerable evidence from which firm conclusions can 
be drawn, which becomes clear in what follows.
Inconsistency in timings
Burglary and theft in the United States have declined 
since the early 1980s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1994; 
Walters et al. 2013). From 1990, auto theft and violence 
began to fall in New York City (Bowling 1999), national 
trends shortly following suit (Truman and Planty 2012). 
Property crime in England and Wales peaked in 1992–
1993, subsequently falling (ONS 2016). Operating under 
the assumption that cybercrime offenders require Inter-
net access, initial adoption of the Internet is typically 
dated from the early nineties onward.1 The World Bank 
(2016) estimates the percentage of the population to have 
used the Internet (anywhere) in 1993 at 2% in the US and 
Australia and 0.5% in the UK—home access therefore 
being significantly lower. Comparing these pieces of evi-
dence shows that the crime drop began before significant 
adoption of the Internet in the United States, England 
and Wales.
Property crime fell in Australia from around 2001 
(Mayhew 2012), the closer temporal fit likely underpin-
ning (Payne et al. 2018) interpretation that there has been 
some “displacement of crime and antisocial conduct into 
the online environment”. The US and UK evidence dis-
cussed above suggests any temporal correlation for Aus-
tralia is spurious rather than causal. In addition,  Brown 
(2015) observed that Australian offenders reported 
improved security as the most likely cause of the decline 
in their offending, while Kriven and Ziersch (2007) and 
others have provided more compelling alternative expla-
nations for the decline in car theft. This  point and the 
possibility of displacement are discussed further below.
Cybercrime spread too slowly and in the wrong places
In addition to arriving too late, cybercrime spread too 
slowly to account for the first decade or more of the 
crime drop in the US and the UK. Indeed it is claimed 
that Internet adoption was highly unequal both within 
and between countries (e.g. Kiiski and Pohjola 2002). In 
most developed countries it began with several years of 
dial-up access, with bandwidth increasing over time. 
However, less affluent households more typically associ-
ated with offending are those gaining Internet access later 
than their affluent peers (Middleton and Sorensen 2006; 
Willis and Tranter 2006). It is also implausible that more 
rapidly increasing cybercrime in the twenty-first century 
had a causal effect, since adolescent offending rates were 
already decimated (Butts 2000, Farrell et  al. 2015)  and 
there was no acceleration in the rate of decline in physical 
crimes.
Significant other evidence is inconsistent with cybercrime
Research has shown that declines in crime observed in 
Australia, Germany, England and Wales, the US and else-
where are consistent with the introduction of improved 
security measures (Kriven and Ziersch 2007; Farrell et al. 
2014). The cybercrime hypothesis, however, is incon-
sistent with significant components of the evidence. For 
example, increases in cybercrime cannot explain why, as 
vehicle crime fell in the UK and Australia, the age of sto-
len vehicles increased: the security hypothesis explains 
this as newer vehicles having better security. Likewise, 
cybercrime  cannot explain how burglaries involving 
forced entry declined but unforced entries did not: the 
security hypothesis explains this as a result of security 
improvements at doors and windows. In fact the cyber-
crime hypothesis is inconsistent with virtually all the evi-
dence relating to security that is tabulated by Tilley et al. 
(2018).
It was not crime displacement or adaptation
The primary mechanism by which cybercrime is assumed 
to have induced the crime drop is attractive displace-
ment: offenders substituting more attractive online crime 
for their physical crime. Yet for the most part it is diffi-
cult to see how cybercrimes serve as good substitutes. 
Cybercrime requires different physical and intellectual 
skills and experience, different tools, and mostly offers a 
different set of rewards under considerably different cir-
cumstances. Which cybercrime would be a good substi-
tute for a street robbery, for instance? When the timing 
and diffusion of the Internet are considered, it is similarly 
implausible that teenagers skilled in joyriding adapted 
and switched to phishing, hacking or other cybercrimes 
and that this led to the decline in physical crime.
A more plausible scenario is adaptive switching for 
cyber-assisted crime such as fraud—if offenders recog-
nised the opportunity and acquired the resources and 
skills. However, as discussed above, this would still occur 
too late to account for the decline in physical crimes.
Contrary to the crime drop, phone theft increased from 
the mid-1990s and gained renewed momentum with the 
spread of smartphones from the late noughties (Har-
rington and Mayhew 2001; Farrell 2015). If displacement 
or adaptation to cybercrime caused most street crimes to 
decline, why not phone theft too?
1 Technically, Tim Berners Lee made the World Wide Web available on 6 
August 1991, the first image was uploaded in 1992, the Mosaic browser was 
launched in late 1993, Netscape was founded in 1994 and went on sale in 
1995. The internet was publicly launched by AOL in 1994 and various indi-
cators suggest it really started to spread in the US from 1995.
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More cybercrime, less violence?
Tcherni et  al. propose that online crime is less violent 
and so violence declined. It is plausible that online crime 
is less likely, on average, to result in violence. However, 
the suggestion that there is a causal connection is mis-
placed: it  involves the same mistakes with regard to the 
timing  and displacement/adaptaton that were discussed 
above.
It was not Internet‑induced lifestyle or cultural change
It is plausible that the Internet has changed lifestyles and 
culture—keeping potential offenders and victims indoors 
thereby reducing their involvement with contact crime 
and increasing guardianship of property. While arguably 
a distinct hypothesis, it warrants mention here. It is sub-
ject to the timing critique discussed above. Other lifestyle 
changes also do not fit: reductions in alcohol use by ado-
lescents in England, for example, occurred from 2003, 
which is a decade later than the crime drop (Bhattacha-
rya 2016). It is also conceivable that security technologies 
mean adolescents stay home more because joyriding and 
other physical crimes are less attractive.
Conclusion
Cybercrime did not cause the crime drop. The timing is 
wrong. The causal mechanisms are wrong. There is no 
robust evidence supporting, but a wealth of evidence 
inconsistent with, the cybercrime hypothesis. There are 
too few decent measures of cybercrime but this is no 
reason to notionally construct a major trend and claim it 
caused a drop in physical crimes internationally.
We suggest that the crime drop and rising cybercrime 
are independent trends caused by broad changes to crime 
opportunity structures. Opportunities for physical crime 
declined due to security improvements. Opportunities 
for cybercrime increased as the Internet spread.
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